exclusion from further involvement in the conflict after they had surrendered, this being required by the rules of the war in which they were engaged, Jewish members were at the same time part of a conflict to which no such rules applied. Hitler's persecution of Jews did not just go to their national but to their religious and biological identity; resisting him was not just a fight in which one risked one's life to win, but a fight for life or death. There should have been no middle ground between these poles, and yet the Jewish prisoners Page 3 of 47 found themselves in the midst of German territory, their lives protected by the very same people who absolutely wanted them dead.
The difficulty of situating the space of the POW camp within the order of war also applies to its legal co-ordinates. Surely, the camp was a legal space (rather than a space outside of law), as it excluded the Jewish prisoners from the extra-legal force of the persecutions. But it also excluded them from exercising their legal agency both in war and in civilian life, to which POWs were not permitted to return until the end of the war. If the camp was not a space that permitted the exercise of legal agency, yet did not release the prisoners into an extra-legal space of freedom, where and what was it? Was it a prison, as its name suggests, even though there was no intention on the part of the law to punish or reform those within it? Was it a protective space, even though this protection was not aimed at prisoners' individual agency (on the contrary, this was suspended) and merely ensured their collective survival as living bodies for the purpose of limiting war? What did this absence of engagement that prisoners experienced -whether by law or by other forces -mean for their existence in the camp?
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In addition to these questions about the status of the camp and the kind of existence it afforded, Levinas's war-time experiences can also be singled out for another reason. He wrote a philosophical work in captivity that he published after the war under the title
Existence and Existents. The main concept developed in this work in a section entitled
Existence Without Existents is the 'there is' (il y a), a concept that Levinas all but abandoned in his post-war turn towards the ethical relation to the other. The 'there is' has been described as 'one of Levinas' most fascinating propositions' (Blanchot, 1986: 49) , leading Jacques Derrida, who 'discovered Existence and Existents by chance in a Paris bookshop in the early 1960s' (Bernasconi, 2001: vii) , first to engage with Levinas's work (see Derrida, 1978) . However, the 'there is' has also been described as elusive -'Levinas can barely say even what it is not' (Bernasconi, 2001 : xii) -and this may explain the concept's 'inherent impenetrability' (Bernasconi, 2001: xv) . Indeed, it is not uncommon to regard the 'there is' as reflecting no experience at all, even as something that is by definition beyond experience. Hent de Vries (2005: 388-389 ) thus regards the 'there is' as the result of a pure thought experiment by which persons and things are subtracted from the world until nothing is left that could be phenomenologically accessed or represented. De Vries writes that even though Levinas philosophically reflects on the Page 5 of 47 impersonal, undifferentiated being -the 'there is' -that remains after the world has been emptied of persons and things, 'he admits that there can be no representation of this dimension.' De Vries consequently questions whether it is possible for Levinas to keep a place in his discourse 'for this shadow side of our existence.'
This article makes no claim of being able to engage with these philosophical theories on their own terms; however, it does offer the description of a legal space (the POW camp) in which people experienced non-experience. It is true, for a small minority of Western forces German war captivity turned out to be a time of study, sporting endeavours and attempts to escape. However, for the vast number of Western POWs, the years of their captivity were filled to varying extents with drudgery and boredom, a seemingly endless wait on the prisoners' part to be released into a life once more of their own making.
On the basis of this experience by the majority, war captivity and the legal space of the POW camp could perhaps simply be dismissed as uninteresting, particularly when compared with its 'big brother,' the concentration camp ('big' in terms of the amount of relevant scholarship, not in terms of the number of people who passed through it; this is dwarfed by the estimated 35m people in war captivity in the Second World War (Davis, Page 6 of 47 1977: 162)). When Levinas (2009: 201) begins a short piece on his experiences as a POW by stating that '[e]verything has been said of captivity,' he thus means that there is really nothing interesting to add, that it is simply a matter of 'the greyness of the barbed wire enclosure' and 'foggy mornings when one leaves for work ' (Levinas, 2009: 201) .
However, at least from a historical perspective, it seems that not much has been said yet. It has thus been noted that despite significant progress in this respect over the last decades, historical scholarship from a global comparative perspective on war captivity in the Second World War is only in its beginning stages, most historians having concentrated on the Holocaust in its wider sense, including the fate of Soviet POWs in Germany (Bischof et al., 2005: 14-15) . And although there is a sizeable amount of legal scholarship on the laws relating to POWs, most of it is narrow in focus, concentrating on specific norms and legal arrangements (Overmans, 1999a: 487) .
One is thus left with biographical, mostly descriptive, accounts of war captivity. While these sometimes appear to offer little more than an enumeration of minor hardships and prison life anecdotes, seemingly confirming that for Western forces, war captivity was a largely unremarkable, even if unpleasant, experience, readers will however find themselves Page 7 of 47 struck by a sense of unease and melancholy that pervades all these accounts, and the cause of which is often difficult to locate. There is a sense that something happened in the camps after all, that war captivity was an experience that was not just unpleasant, but in some way disturbing. After the war, many ex-POWs thus found it difficult to talk or write about their time in captivity until much later in life. Like many others, Levinas and his fellow inmates did not keep in touch (Malka, 2006: 78) , and Levinas himself hardly ever spoke about this time and only rarely mentioned it in his work. Can this really be attributed merely to survivor's guilt or the urge of prisoners to forget and move on after the war (Malka, 2006: 78)?
This article asks what happens to subjectivity in a space of exclusion devoid of engagement by others. It will first set out the conditions of Levinas's war captivity, before then mapping the imagined interruption of relations to persons and things set out in Existence and Existents onto the real interruption of relations experienced by Levinas in the camp. It will argue that in the camp, prisoners were left in a state of suspension between life and death in which their subjectivity progressively dissolved until there was only impersonal existence:
For where the continual play of our relations with the world is interrupted we find neither death nor the 'pure ego,' but the anonymous state of being . . . the Being which we become aware of when the world disappears is not a person or a thing, or the sum total of persons and things; it is the fact that one is, the fact that there is. (Levinas, 2001: 8) The project of reading a philosophical concept into a historical situation and from there into a space conditioned by law does not come without its own problems. One of these is the existing philosophical and literary genealogy of the 'there is,' which reaches back to the thought of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Blanchot before the war (see, for example, Bernasconi, 2001; Caygill, 2002: 49-69; Davies, 1990; Fagenblat, 2005; Large, 2002; Robbins, 1999: 91-116 and Rolland, 2003.) Indeed, Levinas himself writes in the preface to Existence and Existents that even though 'these studies . . . were . . . written down for the most part in captivity,' they had been 'begun before the war ' (2001: xxvii) . Without contesting the significance and interest of these connections and continuities, as well as the philosophical interpretations and analyses that have been advanced of the concept generally (for very different examples of these, see Bergo, 1999; Caygill, 2002; Critchley, 1997; Fagenblat, 2002; Large, 2002; Morgan, 2007; Rose, 1992; de Vries, 2005; Wood, 2005) , this article proceeds on the understanding that philosophical concepts may draw their life from more than one source, and that adding to these sources enlarges the range of It is the latter account, not the former, which this article disputes, both through the historical material that it offers and through its proposal to read the 'there is' as the evil arising in the face of no other rather than in the face of violence and persecution. The fact that Levinas himself at times appears to blur the line between what he experienced and the experiences he felt to be rightly his, 3 only highlights how difficult it was to carry forward the memory of a time where nothing happened. Underlying this wish 'to remain amongst those who would be persecuted' was not just a feeling of solidarity but also the belief that for Jews, an active association with their faith had ceased to be a matter of choice. As Levinas (1990a: 69) However, Levinas's German captors had no intention of sending him to a concentration camp. As evidenced by the low mortality rate amongst Western POWs (Overmans, 1999b: 14) , Germany largely observed the requirements of the Geneva Convention in relation to its enemies on the Western front (Britain, France and the USA) and included within this compliance their Jewish members. Yves Durand (1999: 73) thus writes that 'the German armed forces by no means followed national socialist principles in this case, but complied with the general rules of the laws of war.' He rightly calls this a 'most astonishing' circumstance (Durand, 1999: 73) .
In German war captivity
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As astonishing as it was, the reasons for the protection of Jewish POWs should be sought in politics and strategy rather than in moral scruples. There were considerations of reciprocity on the German side, as well as the perceived need to maintain an atmosphere in which collaboration with France remained possible. There was also, perhaps most crucially, the fact that POW camps were administered and overseen by the German military rather than the SS. Although the German military was by no means innocent of the murder of Jews elsewhere, the survival of Western POWs of Jewish faith can be said to have been largely attributable to its refusal to allow Germany's security and paramilitary forces to interfere in matters of POW administration. In this respect, the recognition by the military that the type of war fought on the Western front could not be practically combined with Nazi ideology without damaging the military's interests and objectives played an important part. After all, the war on the Western front was -particularly in the early stages -still conducted as a limited, 'gentlemanly' (Best, 1980: 218) (Overmans, 2005: 872) . Although Jewish POWs were often separated from their nonJewish compatriots and, where they were required to work, were sometimes discriminated against and harassed, 5 they were generally not in danger of their lives (Overmans, 1999a: 503) (although an exception to this occurred in instances where Jewish doctors were tasked with looking after those that had fallen ill in epidemics without receiving prior vaccinations; see Stelzl-Marx, 2000 : 770, Durand, 1982 : 354 and Berg, 1990 .) The camps thus became islands of protection within a doubly hostile territory.
One million French prisoners of war, Levinas amongst them, remained in Germany until the end of the war. The POWs were divided amongst a large number of camps across Germany (there were almost 250 POW camps in Germany by the end of the war, each with countless satellite work camps, in total numbering in their thousands (Overmans, 2005: 853 comrades-in-arms (Levinas, 1990b: 152) appear to have lived in such a satellite camp, a disused farm called 'Stelterhof' located in the vicinity of the forest in which they were put to work (Levinas, 2011: 27) . This was nothing unusual; many POWs were accommodated near to their place of work, as there was often no transport available and the daily return to the main camp would have been impracticable or impossible on foot.
While no information is available on the precise capacity in which Levinas worked in the forest (his son describes him as having been a 'lumberjack' (in Malka, 2006: 261)), it is known that the workers in his detail got up at dawn and worked until about six o'clock with one lunch break. After that, they had time to themselves (Malka, 2006: 77) . They also had one day off each week, which placed them in a better position than many ordinary footsoldiers, whom Stephen Tyas (2010: 200) reports as having been 'forced to work 12 hours a day, day after day, every week of every month for years.' 7 Although the work detail was restricted to Jewish prisoners, there is no indication that the work its members carried out was any more degrading or punishing than that of other details. POWs are said to have generally preferred work in the agricultural sector over that in the mining and production industries, as working and living conditions in the countryside were thought to be better (Bories-Sawala, 1996: 216-217 and that this meant 'that his experience of the camp was even more insecure and traumatic than that of his fellow non-Jewish POWs' should therefore not, without more evidence, be taken as an inference of hardship or maltreatment that may have been targeted specifically at Jews. All French NCOs were effectively required to work, and while the legality of this requirement under international law was disputed even at the time (for more details, see Bories-Sawala, 1996 and Durand, 1982 and 1999 , there was no distinction made in this respect between Jews and non-Jews. 8 It is true that Levinas and his fellow Jewish POWs that he refers to after the war when he imagines the world from the perspective of Holocaust victims (Levinas, 1996a: 119) . It is important to realise, however, that for the purpose of the 'there is,' the world that is sinking away from the subject is not the world the subject believes in, but the world as constituted by the subject's interlocutors, its meaningful others. Once these relations are cut, the world disappears from the subject' represents a different relation to the world that emerges only in the absence of others and the meaning they give to one's life. As such, the 'there is' is neither an objective aspect of the world -i.e., the world absent of meaning -nor a subjective feeling on the part of the subject. It is an absence of meaning that has materialised as a new relation to the world, a relation with nothing, a non-relation.
In Not only was war captivity not an extension of combat nor amounted to persecution that could be resisted, it was also not something that the law imposed either as a punishment or as a measure of protecting prisoners' agency, whether out of humanitarian concerns or otherwise. It was in fact not directed at the prisoners at all. As a legal institution, the function of war imprisonment at this time was still primarily to protect war, not its participants. The law excluded those who surrendered or were defeated from further violent action only to ensure that war would end at defeat rather than annihilation. Plurality was a guarantee for war, as it kept open the possibility of future wars. The beneficiary, i.e., that which law intended to protect, was therefore war itself and not the prisoners. The latter were merely the living proof that limited war was being conducted, their collective lives constituting the border between limited and unlimited war (Jacques, 2015).
As such, the POW camp was a neutral space, even though this was not the benevolent and provisional sense of neutrality commonly conceived. The camp did not constitute a ground from which prisoners could freely proceed to choose sides; it was not a basis for but an exclusion from agency. War captivity excluded prisoners from all the meaningful categories of agency in war (enemy, friend, foe, neutral), reducing the prisoners to an indeterminate existence and confining them to a space in-between whose co-ordinates suddenly appeared
Page 26 of 47 uncertain. Where was one if one was no longer on the human map of enmity, could no longer even reach the ground from which one could choose sides? Was one still amongst humans, still human? Levinas writes about the 'inhuman neutrality ' (in Rolland, 2003: 27) of the 'there is,' its 'horrific neutrality' (Levinas, 1990b: 292) .
Some of the prisoners sought to escape from this state of forced neutrality. They hatched out plans to provoke their captors by playing pranks on them ('"goon-baiting"' (Smith, 1968: 78)), or more seriously, attempted to escape from the camp altogether. At stake in these attempts to turn the enemy's attention back towards them was not only the participating prisoners' sense of identity and purpose, but also their individuality. War imprisonment meant prisoners were permanently condemned to the anonymity of their number and unit, as they no longer had the opportunity to distinguish themselves individually through action; in escaping, they saw a chance to regain this individuality in front of their fellow inmates as well as their home nation. The idea of facelessness implies not only the absence of a face or a face turned away, but also the inability to 'read' the intentions of the other. In the 'there is,' whatever happensand strictly speaking, nothing happens -happens without an author that can be determined. which was neither self-determined nor attributable to the actions of others. Not only was there no-one else to blame, there was also no agency they themselves could lay claim to.
Although they were working during the day, this work appeared senseless: '[T]hey perform actions in the real world without reality,' Levinas writes about the POWs, 'not only an absence of objects but an absence of progress, of achievement' (Levinas, 2009: 126) .
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The loss of ownership of one's life in the camp, the draining away of one's subjectivity, could only be stemmed by recourse to the camp's physical and temporal outside. Mail and news about the on-going war temporarily pierced the emptiness, reminding prisoners that there was an outside world after all, a world which contained -paradoxically, it was the outside that contained, while the contained space of the prison camp was empty -a meaningful past and future.
However, both past and future became more difficult concepts for the POWs the longer their captivity lasted. The trauma of action and capture distanced prisoners from their past life, and interrogators were skilled in further reducing prisoners' emotional ties to the world they left behind in order to increase their control over them. Sooner or later, prisoners discovered that they were no longer able to remember details about their past. 'Every
Page 31 of 47 prisoner finds that his memory fails him in some way. He cannot remember dates, names, streets, addresses or his own phone number in his home. The past seems to fade out and there is only the present' (Lunden, 1948 (Lunden, -1949 . As to the future, which 'alone could finally date and give meaning to life ' (Durand, 1987: 137-138) , it moved ever further away as it became more difficult for prisoners to imagine how they could take up the severed threads of their lives. Without the hope of a future ('because one never knows when it will finally begin' (Durand, 1987: 137) ) the present turned into 'a miserable present' (Durand, 1987: 137) , its usually fleeting character replaced by permanence. As one POW describes, The horror of the night, as an experience of the there is, does not then reveal to us a danger of death, nor even a danger of pain. . . . There is horror of being and not anxiety over nothingness, fear of being and not fear for being; there is being prey to, delivered over to something that is not a "something." (Levinas, 2001: 57-58) Levinas then claims that the 'there is' as pure being is not just the primordial object of fear, but also the real 'nothingness' -a nothingness that can be experienced as an interruption in the middle of one's life and should therefore no longer be located at its limits:
One starts with being, which is a content limited by nothingness. Nothingness is still envisaged as the end and limit of being, as an ocean which beats up against it on all sides.
But we must ask if "nothingness," unthinkable as a limit or negation of being, is not possible as interval and interruption . . .. (Levinas, 2001: 60) Nothingness conceived as an interval means that being is no longer opposed to nothingness, but incorporates it as its central element. Unless there are relations that give life meaning, being is nothingness, a dying of a certain kind of death. Levinas (2001: 5) This article has sought to describe the historical and legal conditions of Levinas's imprisonment in a bid to establish the experience of war captivity as one of interest in its own right. It attempted to show that the law excluded prisoners such as Levinas from all meaningful relations, holding them fast in a space in which their agency was suspended and which, although surrounded by others, was regarded by no-one. By reading the experience of war captivity through Levinas's concept of the 'there is,' this article sought to articulate the impact of this exclusion on prisoners' subjectivity.
Although one cannot but recognise that it was law which saved Levinas's life during the Second World War, it was also law which, through its mechanisms of exclusion, was responsible for the loss of world and ensuing meaninglessness that he and his fellow prisoners experienced. It is hoped that the above analysis will contribute to understanding the impact of law on those whom it neither enables to live a meaningful life nor entirely excludes from its remit, but simply holds in a space of indifference until such time as it chooses to release them.
